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Regulating the Corporate Tap: Applying Global
Administrative Law Principles to Achieve the Human Right
to Water
KRISTIN L. RETHERFORD*
“Under the current model of globalization, everything is for sale. Areas
once considered our common heritage are being commodified,
commercialized and privatized at an alarming rate. Today, more than
ever before, the targets of this assault comprise the building blocs of
life as we know it on this planet, including freshwater, the human
genome, seeds and plant varieties, the air and atmosphere, the oceans
and outer space. The assault on, and defence of, the commons is one of
the great ideological and social struggles of our times.”1
INTRODUCTION
On July 28, 2010, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a
momentous resolution establishing the right to safe and clean drinking water as
“essential for the full enjoyment of the right to life.”2 Shortly after, on September
30, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council, approving a second
resolution, declared that water and sanitation are human rights derived from the
right to an adequate standard of living.3 The resolution held that this right is
“inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health, as well as the right to life and human dignity.”4 According to
Catarina de Albuquerque, the U.N. Independent Expert on human rights obligations
related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, “[T]his means that for the
UN, the right to water and sanitation, is contained in existing human rights treaties
and is therefore legally binding. . . . [T]his landmark decision has the potential to
change the lives of billions of human beings . . . .”5

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to
Professor Aman for his helpful suggestions and insight on this complex issue, to the staff of the
Indiana Law Journal for their diligent work in bringing this Note to publication, and to my
family for their years of unconditional encouragement and support. Special thanks to my
mother who has always taught me to believe in the pursuit of justice.
1. Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Recipients, Acceptance Speech at The Right
Livelihood Awards 2005 (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.rightlivelihood.org/
barlow_and_clarke_speech.html.
2. G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010). See MAUDE
BARLOW, OUR RIGHT TO WATER: A PEOPLE’S GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS’
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO WATER AND SANITATION 4 (Council of Canadians 2011),
available at http://www.canadians.org/water/documents/RTW/righttowater-0611.pdf.
3. Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Human Rights
Council Res. 15/9, 15th Sess., Oct. 6, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9 (Sept. 30, 2010).
See BARLOW, supra note 2, at 4.
4. H.R.C. Res. 15/9, supra note 3, ¶ 3.
5. UN United to Make the Right to Water and Sanitation Legally Binding, OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Oct. 1, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted),
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These two resolutions represent remarkable progress in the struggle for water
justice, the human rights movement, and the environmental movement. The U.N.
rarely recognizes new human rights; it is even rarer for a right that has become so
politicized over the years to be recognized.6 However, these potentially powerful
resolutions have only provided the countries of the world with guiding principles
on how to manage and distribute their water supply, and they will only be as
meaningful as the people and governments allow them to be.
One of the significant obstacles facing the realization of a right to water is the
increasing occurrence of water privatization contracts in developing countries.7
Water privatization, which is the governmental sale of water services including the
maintenance, planning, and operational responsibilities to a private company,8
should bring about efficiency and improvements in living conditions since
specialized private companies have the knowledge and resources to expand and
upgrade services that governments typically do not possess.9 However, the results
of these contracts have not been beneficial to the people and their land in
developing countries, as profit-seeking agendas prioritize shareholder expectations
and quarterly earnings to the needs and values of the people they are meant to
service.10
This Note argues that unregulated water privatization undermines the United
Nations’ recognition of a human right to water. While monitoring and regulatory
oversight of water privatization still, in theory, fall within the state’s purview,
whether or not such monitoring is effective or even occurs is less certain.11
Furthermore, international regulation is wholly ineffective, as most codes of
conduct, guidelines, and compacts are merely voluntary and have little or no
enforcement mechanisms.12 Therefore, a human right to water can only be achieved
through more effective governance mechanisms and public participation, and
principles of global administrative law may be the best suited means to realize this
right.
Part I of this Note provides background as to the great role economic
globalization has played in shifting the control of water services throughout the
world and introduces the concept of global administrative law. Part II discusses the
emergence of powerful transnational corporations in the water sector and the
current state of, or lack of, enforcement mechanisms to constrain their practices and
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10403&LangID=
E.
6. See BARLOW, supra note 2, at 5.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 14
(David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters eds., 2005).
9. See generally PETER H. GLEICK, GARY WOLFF, ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI & RACHEL
REYES, THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND
PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER (2002) (explaining the various pros and cons of water
privatization contracts).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global
Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143, 147 (2005); David Vogel, The Private
Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 184
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
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agendas. Part III reveals the various economic, environmental, and social
consequences of unregulated water privatization in the developing world, with a
particular focus on the failed water privatization attempt in Cochabamba, Bolivia
and the currently failing water privatization concession in Jakarta, Indonesia. Part
IV concludes by conceding that privatization is an irreversible trend and argues the
right to water can only be achieved through a transformation of the current state of
law. By applying principles of global administrative law to various aspects of water
privatization bidding processes and implementation of contracts, it may be possible
for states to reconcile water as both a social and economic good.
I. HOW GLOBALIZATION CHANGED THE VALUE OF WATER
To have a real discussion of how municipalities under water privatization
contracts can benefit from global administrative law, it is crucial to first explore the
various effects that globalization has had on the water sector and the dominant
actors within it. This Part first considers the various arguments surrounding the
globalization debate, and then turns to problems that can arise when water becomes
a commodity as a result of economic globalization. Finally, the effects of
globalization on governance mechanisms is explored, and a new kind of law is
introduced that may be best suited for the regulation of global issues such as water
distribution and human rights.
A. The Globalization Debate
When the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written, the right to
water was not mentioned.13 This omission was not the result of deliberate
discussion and thoughtful debate, but rather quite the opposite. At that time, no one
imagined a world without clean, abundant water because the assumption was that
water was self-replenishing, and that the hydrologic cycle would simply replace
any water used or abused.14 With this false notion in mind, people, businesses, and
governments “polluted, mismanaged, and displaced water as if it was
indestructible.”15 The driving force behind this increasing disregard for the intrinsic
value of water, many argue, was the direct result of globalization.16
Globalization can be described as the “expanding scale, growing magnitude,
speeding up, and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social
interaction.”17 The term denotes a “shift or transformation in the scale of human

13. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); UN Recognises Water as a Human Right, SOUTHCENTRE.ORG,
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1380%3Asb5
0&catid=144%3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en.
14. See BARLOW, supra note 2, at 6.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 79–83 (2002); MATTHIAS FINGER & JEREMY
ALLOUCHE, WATER PRIVATISATION: TRANS-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE REREGULATION OF THE WATER INDUSTRY 2–7 (2002).
17. See David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An
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social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power
relations [across borders].”18 However, there is no one agreed-upon definition of
globalization, and the emotions that arise when thinking about it are often quite
polarized.19 It has been said that every generation has concepts that capture the
public imagination, and it appears that globalization is one for this age: “The
term . . . crystallizes both the hopes of some people that we will finally achieve a
global society and the fears of many others that their lives and jobs are threatened
by forces beyond their control.”20
In theory, globalization should benefit all people because it can produce greater
overall economic value. Globalization has the potential to help developing nations
catch up to industrialized nations much faster through increased employment, the
breakdown of trade barriers, and the advancement of technology and
communication.21 The term itself seems to suggest integration and coordination, but
globalization has clearly not resulted in a “harmonious world society or a universal
process of global integration in which there is a growing convergence of cultures
and civilizations.”22 Anti-globalists argue that globalization weakens national
sovereignty and allows rich nations to outsource domestic jobs and businesses
overseas where labor is cheaper and environmental standards are less strict.23 These
critics do not see the opportunity for prosperity, peace, and democracy claimed by
globalization’s supporters. Rather, they see a greater potential for conflict, extreme
self-interest, unbridled corporate power, and disregard for people and
communities.24
B. Economic Globalization and the Commodification of Water
The anti-globalist position becomes stronger when one considers the effect that
globalization has had on the exploitation of public resources such as water.
Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1, 4 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER].
18. See id.
19. The World Bank has even stated that: “Amazingly for so widely used a term, there
does not appear to be any precise, widely-agreed definition. Indeed the breadth of meanings
attached to [globalization] seems to be increasing rather than narrowing over time, taking on
cultural, political and other connotations in addition to the economic.” Michele Putko,
Defining and Quantifying Globalization 2 (Mar. 15, 2006) (strategy research project, U.S.
Army War College).
20. Peter A. Hall & Sidney Tarrow, Globalization and Area Studies: When Is Too Broad
Too Narrow?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 23, 1998, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/GlobalizationArea/99332/.
21. See generally David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 447, 447–54 (arguing that increasing
globalization offers poorer economies many opportunities to improve their position in the
world).
22. See Held & McGrew, supra note 17.
23. See Globalization: Progress or Profiteering?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 4, 2012),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/globalization.asp#axzz1ibEvrGBn.
24. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (1996); SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
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Through economic globalization—which is the increasing economic
interdependence of national economies across the world through a rapid increase in
cross-border movement of goods, services, technology, and capital25—industrial
production has been able to reach new levels. Such emphasis on growth, however,
creates impediments for competing countries trying to make preservation or
conservation a priority.26 Increasing consumption and profit maximization take
precedence over water use efficiency, conservation improvements, and even citizen
need.
The predominant ideology that has emerged as a result of this increasing
economic globalization is the Washington Consensus model, which features
substantial government deregulation of trade, investment, and finance.27 This
model, led by the dominant economic powers and financial institutions,28 argues
that progress can only be achieved in a tightly-integrated global economy
established on principals of “trade liberalization, privatization, and macrostability.”29 Thus, it is essential to this model that capital, goods, and services move
freely across borders, undisturbed by government intervention or regulation. This
means, however, that even human and environmental concerns come second to the
free flow of goods.30 In the global market, rectifying a depleted local resource is
easy: “When the East Coast cod are depleted, we just move on to Chilean sea
bass.”31 Businesses within this model do not view natural resources as a social
good, but rather, an economic good to be managed by market forces just like any
other commodity.32
Commodification is defined as “the process of converting a good or service
formerly subject to many non-market social rules into one that is primarily subject
to market rules.”33 Once a public resource becomes established as a profitable
commodity to be bought and sold on the free market, the more likely it will become
the target of financial markets, and the more likely it will become exploited in order
to maximize that profit.34 This exploitation will inevitably result in resource

25. See RAKESH MOHAN JOSHI, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 9–10 (2009).
26. See Maude Barlow, The Fight for Liquid Assets: Transnational Corporations are
Taking Control of a Basic Element of Life, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 16, 2000, at A15, available
at http://www.commondreams.org/views/081600-106.htm.
27. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 82; Larry Catá Backer, Economic
Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis of the State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging
Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141, 145–46
(2006).
28. These dominant powers typically include westernized countries such as the United
States, United Kingdom, China, and Japan, and their complementary financial institutions
consist of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
29. See Backer, supra note 27, at 145. Micro-stability, these proponents claim, will
supposedly be achieved in the long run. Id.
30. See Barlow, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 9, at 3.
34. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 92. See generally NICK WILKINSON,
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 32–36 (2005) (discussing the
basic profit-maximizing model).
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scarcity, which will drive the prices of the good up even further.35 Coupled with
increased demand, the potential for driving service and quality down is significant.
While this process is not as grave a concern for traditional goods and services that
are not absolutely necessary for life, and which have viable substitutes, the stakes
become much higher and the consequences much more disastrous when
considering such a vital, irreplaceable public resource such as the world’s water
supply.36
To further complicate issues, the global economy is fueled by the “financial
casino,” in which investors speculate or gamble on fluctuations in the commodity
prices.37 Instead of buying long-term shares in corporations, investors temporarily
put their money in markets that offer high-end, short-term returns, and can at any
time, and for whatever reason, withdraw their money and move it to a more
profitable investment.38 Unfortunately, a country’s economy that relies on these
investments can become destabilized at the whim of the market.
There is no substitute for water; it is a necessary resource that is required for
survival. Therefore, it cannot be left to the whims of the market for protection.
Instead, water must be regarded as a public social good and be under the control of
accountable institutions, not profit-seeking corporations. Treating water as an
economic good has implications that reach far beyond the market—implications
that touch the very way people live and interact with one another.39
C. The Emergence of Global Governance
As globalization increasingly expands throughout the world, the question
becomes, how are organizations, institutions, and markets coordinated in this
increasingly globalized world? Traditional domestic law is no longer best suited to
address globalized issues that transcend national borders and laws.40 Therefore,
many scholars have argued that the only way to truly address global issues such as
water conservation and human rights is through some form of global governance.41
Global governance has been defined as “the complex of formal and informal
institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states,
markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through
which collective interests on the global plane[t] are articulated, rights and

35. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 92.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM (1997) (introducing the term
and arguing that the western financial system has begun to look more and more like a
casino).
38. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 93; STRANGE, supra note 37, at 163.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See, e.g., Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 10
(2006).
41. See, e.g., AFSHIN AKHTARKHAVARI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2010); 4
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS (Roger Brownsword ed.,
2004).
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obligations are established, and differences are mediated.”42 Basically, global
governance is the management of global processes in the absence of a global
government, and today, almost all human activity is subject to some form of global
regulation.43
Much of global governance is regulatory administration, and regulatory
administration is organized and shaped by principles of administrative law.44
Therefore, globalization brings with it an increase in the importance of
administrative law. Based on these observations, many scholars have claimed that a
new area of law is in development—global administrative law—in which important
regulatory functions are no longer exclusively domestic, but have taken on a global
nature.45 The substance of the rules created by global regulatory institutions is not
the predominant concern, but rather the “actual or potential application of
principles, procedural rules and . . . other mechanisms.”46
With traditional international law, states agree to a set of norms and are free to
accept or reject these norms at any time, but in order to be effective, international
laws need to be ratified and implemented at the domestic level.47 On the other hand,
legislative or primarily adjudicatory bodies do not make the rules for global
administrative law. Instead, global administrative law has been said to encompass
the “mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies.”48
Such accountability provides for “adequate standards of transparency, participation,
reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and
decisions [these bodies] make.”49 Thus, there is more flexibility for governance of
global issues under this approach than with traditional international law. And
because global regulation is less and less defined in terms of agreements among
states, the nature of the international legal order is changing in a way that requires
such global action.
The emergence of global administrative law mechanisms are already observable
in many different areas: in notice-and-comment procedures adopted by
international standard-setters such as the Basel Committee or the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),50 in the Inspection Panel set up

42. ARCHNA NEGI, COHERENCE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2008) (quoting Thomas G. Weiss & Ramesh Thakur, THE UN AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN IDEA AND ITS PROSPECTS (2006)) (presented as part of the Twelfth
EADI General Conference).
43. See What is Global Administrative Law?, IRPA.EU, http://www.irpa.eu/gal-section.
[hereinafter Global Administrative Law].
44. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 2.
45. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 25 (2005).
46. Global Administrative Law, supra note 43.
47. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 3–4.
48. Kingsbury et. al, supra note 45, at 17, 27–28.
49. Id. at 17.
50. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 210 (2005).
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by the World Bank to ensure its own compliance with its internal policies,51 and in
U.N. responses to the hesitant engagement of domestic courts in reviewing Security
Council sanctions against individuals.52 While presently unsystematized and
somewhat fragmented as a body of law, these examples show that core principles
are starting to emerge within this field of law.53 These principles include both the
classical administrative law conceptions of fair and legal decision making and
review procedures, and more substantive “good governance” values including rules
requiring greater transparency and participation and the opening of new or
strengthened avenues of judicial and administrative review.54
It is clear that globalization forces have had a tremendous effect on the water
sector. With such emphasis on growth, one would assume that there would be a
similar increase in the availability of water, but that is not what we have seen.
Turning water into a commodity creates a market in which only those who can
afford the fluctuating costs of water will have access to it. However, while
globalization has contributed greatly to this problem, at the same time, it has
allowed for the emergence of a new field of law in which these problems can be
addressed. As the next Part will explain, the necessity of these global governance
values in the water sector is becoming increasingly important.
II. WHO OWNS THE WATER?
The changing role of the state, which is one of the major characteristics of
globalization, is at the core of many of the issues that underlie failed privatization
schemes and human rights violations. This Part explores the increasing power
transnational corporations are gaining through privatization contracts at the expense
of the state, and then argues that the negative results are largely due to the lack of
enforcement mechanisms to restrain the oftentimes destructive and purely profitmaximizing behavior of these corporations.
A. Changing Role of the State
As with the globalization debate, there is no clear consensus as to whether the
changing role of the state is beneficial or detrimental. Some argue that while the
role of the state is changing, it is not necessarily diminishing its position in the
world, but rather its position in the global system is simply being transformed in
new ways.55 For example, states have more options for participation in the

51. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 4.
52. See id.
53. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Weiner,
Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches
to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2005).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through
Government Networks, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 189;
SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 45–96 (2007) (arguing against scholarship
that assumes the national and the global are mutually exclusive and noting a new trend: that
“the state is one of the strategic institutional domains in which critical work on the
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governing of the global economy because the geography of economic globalization
is strategic, and that this strategic geography is partially embedded in national
territories.56 Furthermore, because the global financial system has reached “a level
of complexity that requires the existence of a cross border network of financial
centers,” some argue that the state will always play a critical role in the global
system.57
Others contend that these globalization forces are causing the state to lose its
sovereignty, and in the process, the power of the state is shifting and becoming
concentrated in new non-governmental actors, at great expense to the state.58 The
real consequence of this transformation is that there is now a deficiency in
legitimacy and public participation, because the market, by itself, “has never been
able to provide . . . security against violence, stable money for trade and
investment, a clear system of law and the means to enforce it, and a sufficiency of
public goods like drains, water supplies, infrastructures for transport and
communications.”59 The principle characteristic of this transformation is
dependence, as the state’s role becomes limited to merely carrying out the will of
non-resident actors.60 So as globalization welcomed these new actors into the world
market, it failed to simultaneously provide for any protection from abuse by these
actors to the land and people with whom they contract.
Global administrative law seems pertinent no matter which position is taken
because it presumes a newly emerging, “multifaceted global administrative space”
comprised of various types of administrative institutions and entities working
together.61 In this space, the distinction between domestic and international law has
become blurred as the various regulators come together in international forums to
decide administrative standards and procedures.62 Accompanying these “top down”
approaches are typically “bottom up” approaches, which include, for example,
domestic courts exercising judicial oversight of global regulation.63 So while it does
appear that the role of the state would be transformed under global administrative
law, it does not necessarily mean that its power is undermined; in fact, global
administrative law could empower the states, as will be discussed later.64 However,
as the law currently stands, it is not difficult to see some truth in the concerns the
development of globalization takes place . . . does not necessarily produce the decline of the
state, but neither does it keep the state going as usual, nor does it merely produce adaptations
to new conditions. The state becomes the site for foundational transformations. . . .”).
56. See SASSEN, supra note 55, at 57.
57. See id. at 68.
58. See, e.g., Susan Strange, The Declining Authority of States, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 127.
59. Id. at 128.
60. Backer, supra note 27, at 146. Backer argues that it does not matter whether you
focus on the Washington Consensus of private economic transactional neo-liberal
globalization, a more traditionally state-centered and international relations based analytical
perspective, or a moral and political critique of Western-led economic globalization—they
all ultimately posit the same consequences for the state.
61. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 45, at 18.
62. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 11.
63. See Andrew D. Mitchell & John Farnik, Global Administrative Law: Can It Bring
Global Governance to Account?, 37 FED. L. REV. 237, 253 (2009).
64. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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pessimistic perspective raises when considering the enormous power and influence
these new unregulated actors have obtained.
B. The Rise of the Transnational Corporations
The most prominent new actors in the water sector are non-governmental
organizations (NGOs)65 and transnational corporations (TNCs).66 These actors have
become partners of international organizations, which together, have started
forming new governance mechanisms.67 The primary focus of this Note, however,
is the emerging power of TNCs.
TNCs, simply put, are corporations that operate in more than one nation at a
time. TNCs have a tremendous impact on the global economy—in 2000, an
estimated 63,000 were in existence, and in 1993, seventy percent of the world’s
trade activities were related to them, and half of that trade was simply intra-firm.68
While globalization arguably gave rise to the formation of these cross-border
corporations, it is fair to say that TNCs have grown to the point where they are now
actively driving the process.69
In the global water sector, there are actually very few TNCs as a result of
various mergers and acquisitions over the past couple of decades.70 Through this
process, the power of production and marketing has become concentrated in the
hands of fewer and fewer corporations and as a result, the “Water Barons” have
emerged, consisting primarily of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (“Suez”), Vivendi
Environment, and Thames Water.71 The World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, the financial institutions that drive the global economic market,
have further helped the Water Barons accumulate their tremendous economic and
political power. These powerful and resourceful institutions have not only provided

65. NGOs are legally constituted organizations that operate independently from any
government, and typically take the form of social action that encompasses political
messages. See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER,
supra note 17, at 204. Some of the active NGOs in this sector are the World Development
Movement (WDM) and the Coalition Against Water Privatization (CAWP). However, not
all NGOs are against globalization or privatization. In fact, some of the most prominent
NGOs, such as Greenpeace, support water privatization. Therefore, even within the
environmental NGOs, there is great tension on this subject.
66. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 83; FINGER & ALLOUCHE, supra note 16,
at 9–11.
67. See FINGER & ALLOUCHE, supra note 16, at 9.
68. See id. at 10. Intra-firm trade occurs between two subsidiaries of a company, which
means that normal trade laws do not apply, and therefore, can proceed without any
interference. Id.
69. The top 200 transnational corporations are so large and powerful that their combined
annual sales are greater than the sum total of the economies of 182 of the 191 countries in
the world, and of the largest 100 economies, fifty-three are transnational corporations rather
than nation-states. See id.
70. See generally FINGER & ALLOUCHE, supra note 16, at 105–49 (explaining how
mergers and acquisitions have affected TNCs in the water sector).
71. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 129; BLUE GOLD: WORLD WATER WARS
(Purple Turtle Films 2008).
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the financial assistance that is required to build such a global water market, but also
the necessary legal leverage.72 By conditioning loans to weak, developing countries
on agreements to privatize their water services—contracts that almost inevitably go
to these Water Barons—the financial institutions undoubtedly put massive pressure
on developing governments to sign contracts with these private corporations that
otherwise may have never been considered.73
Pessimistic about the changing role of the state, Maude Barlow, an influential
water justice advocate, argues that over the past few decades TNCs have
successfully managed to reinvent government in their own image, and the previous
model of governance has been replaced by a new model—the corporate security
state.74 Barlow argues that in this age of economic globalization, the state’s primary
role is to maintain a “secure place and climate for profitable transnational
investment and competition,” and the priority of this form of governance is to
“provide security for corporations, not citizens.”75
Increasing involvement and power of TNCs in the water sector is problematic
because of their lack of corporate responsibility to the municipalities with whom
they contract, including responsibilities pertaining to human rights and
environmental standards. There have been attempts to regulate transnational
corporate behavior through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,76
the United Nations Global Compact,77 the UN Human Rights Commission Norms
for Transnational Corporations,78 and the Technical Committee 224 of the
International Organization for Standards (ISO),79 but these “soft law” attempts have
been wholly inadequate largely due the fact that they are purely voluntary, and
enforcement mechanisms are either weak, or in some cases, nonexistent.80

72. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 156.
73. These financial institutions will be discussed in much greater detail infra Parts III.A.
& IV.B.3.
74. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 99.
75. Id.
76. The Guidelines are recommendations that “provide voluntary principles and
standards for responsible business conduct in areas such as employment and industrial
relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer
interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation.” Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, OECD, www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines.
77. The UNGC is a “strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to
aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas
of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.” What is the Global Compact?,
UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/.
78. These norms are a set of ethics guidelines bringing together a range of legal
obligations for companies drawn from existing human rights, labor, and environmental
standards. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights: Norms of the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?Opendocument.
79. This committee was formed with the objective of developing standards on services
related to water distribution. See Standards Development, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/
iso_technical_committee?commid=299764.
80. See Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 147; Vogel, supra note 12, at 184.
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Because TNCs lack responsibility, they are free to act as they will, without
considering their effect on the land or people they are contracted to service. Despite
the fact that states retain the ultimate responsibility to monitor these corporations to
assure no clear abuses are occurring, as the case studies will show, governments in
developing countries often lack the power, influence, and resources to adequately
regulate these powerful corporations.81 An alternative form of regulation must
therefore be utilized in order to protect struggling governments from the abusive
practices of these powerful corporations.
What makes the situation even worse for these developing countries is that
TNCs are actually protected under international law. Through bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), TNCs have legally enforceable rights and entitlements as foreign
investors.82 These protections are highly controversial because they give TNCs the
ability to actually trump national regulatory protection and to sue the state for
compensatory damages if its behaviors are constrained by the state, even if by
reasons of human welfare and environmental concerns.83 Thus, the protections
under the current system are wholly one-sided, with the state and its people on the
losing side.
By selling or leasing long-term water services to TNCs, governments essentially
hand over control of a vital public resource to noncompetitive, unaccountable,
profit-seeking corporations that have no other real tie to the country with whom
they are contracting. Significantly, this relinquishment of control limits public input
into the operation of water services and removes a fundamental, legitimate service
from the government. Money is not necessarily the issue. The real concern is the
unrestrained power these corporations obtain in the process. Principles of global
administrative law and the emergence of a global space would allow for new forms
of participation and transparency that encourage public participation and restrain
the behaviors of these corporations. But as the law currently stands, these goals are
not likely to be achieved.
III. EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The lack of regulation of these TNCs in water privatization contracts has led to
dire consequences in developing countries around the world. While the economic
consequences are often easy to discern, these contracts also have great social and
environmental consequences that touch upon the very way people live and interact
with one another.

81. See infra Part IV.A.
82. See What Are BITs?, UNCTAD, Aug. 17, 2004, http://www.unctadxi.org/
templates/Page____1006.aspx; ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE
FOR
SETTLEMENT
OF
INVESTMENT
DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&action
Val=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main (searchable collection of bilateral investment treaties).
83. See Bronwen Morgan, Turning Off the Tap: Urban Water Service Delivery and the
Social Construction of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 215, 222–24 (2006);
SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE 3 (2007).
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A. Economic Consequences
TNCs often claim to be in business for altruistic reasons—to make clean and
affordable water available for more people in the world.84 Indeed, privatization
should, in theory, improve the living and working conditions of a people since
specialized corporations have the experience, knowledge, and resources to expand
and upgrade services that governments typically do not share.85 However, closer
examination of these corporations’ practices reveals quite a different result:
increased customer rates, extraordinary corporate profits, lower quality service,
limited access, corruption and bribery, overuse, and exploitation. As Suez CEO
Gerard Mestrallet once said, “Water is an efficient product. It is a product which
normally would be free, and our job is to sell it.”86
The Cochabamba and Jakarta water privatization contracts are two clear
examples of the economic consequences felt by the governments and people under
these contracts. While the Cochabamba case study provides a clear example of past
water privatization failure and what led to the eventual revocation of the contract,
the failing water privatization attempt in Jakarta, Indonesia provides an example of
an ongoing struggle that could greatly benefit from principles of global
administrative law.
1. Bolivia Water Wars
In 1998, the World Bank refused to guarantee a $25 million loan to Bolivia to
refinance its water services in the city of Cochabamba unless the local government
privatized its water services.87 The World Bank further recommended that there be
no public subsidies to hold down the increases in the price of water service, and in
great deference to the corporations, the contract even dollarized the water
payments, which meant that if the value of the boliviano decreased against the
dollar, the Bolivians’ water bill would increase to the equivalent in U.S. dollars.88
Oscar Olivera, one of the central leaders in the Cochabamba protest movement,
argues that the World Bank’s actions were the direct result of a western perspective
that completely ignored the conditions of the Bolivian people.89 Whereas a $30
increase in a westerner’s monthly water bill is typically not a very substantial
increase, for many Cochabamban families, living where the official minimum wage
was only about $41 per month, such an increase would have been catastrophic.90
Regardless of this knowledge, and without any public input or comment, the

84. See Barlow, supra note 26.
85. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 9.
86. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 88 (internal quotations removed).
87. See POLARIS INST., GLOBAL WATER GRAB: HOW CORPORATIONS ARE PLANNING TO
TAKE CONTROL OF LOCAL WATER SERVICES 9 (2003), available at http://www.ratical.org/coglobalize/GlblH20grab.pdf.
88. OSCAR OLIVERA, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA 9 (2004).
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id.
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Bolivian government privatized its water system with a forty-year contract to
Aguas del Tunari, a corporation virtually unknown to the people of Bolivia.91
At that time, only half of the population was connected to the central water
system; others obtained water from cooperative water houses.92 Members of the
community built these cooperative systems in a variety of ways; often, local
neighborhoods contributed what they could, and sometimes NGOs assisted.93
Under the privatization contract, however, such systems were deemed illegal
because only the contracted company had the authority to distribute water.94
The uninformed and ill-equipped corporation realized very quickly that in order
to make the investments it had promised in the contract, it would have to raise
consumer prices, and almost immediately rates increased an average of 35%,95 and,
in the worst of the reported cases, some residents saw their water bills climb as
high as 300%.96 However, residents did not see any immediate, noticeable
improvements in their water services or quality to justify such an increase. As
frustration mounted, thousands of protestors took to the streets and organized
strikes that halted the Bolivian economy for days; as a result, the government was
forced to revoke the contract.97 The people of Bolivia viewed this revocation as a
great success, but the government was then faced with a long and grueling legal
battle against Aguas del Turani.98
Under the Netherlands-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty,99 Bolivia agreed to
settle all disputes through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), an international arbitration tribunal that is part of the World
Bank.100 While such a tribunal is an example of the emergence of global
governance,101 it is also an example of how beneficial and effective global
administrative law could be for the realization of human rights.
For example, the main problems with the ICSID encompass many of the major
inadequacies that almost all international institutions face: transparency, public
participation, and legitimacy. In this case, the proceedings were done almost

91. Id. at 9–10.
92. Id. at 8–9.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Evo Morales, From Coca To Congress, ZNET (Nov. 11, 2002),
http://www.zcommunications.org/from-coca-to-congress-by-evo-morales.
96. OLIVERA, supra note 88, at 10.
97. Id. at 33–46.
98. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision
on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, 20 ICSID REV./FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 450
(2005),
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC629_En&caseId=C210.
99. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Bol.Neth., art. IX, Mar. 10, 1992, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/
BITSbyCountry/BITs/BOL_Netherlands.pdf.
100. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, WORLD BANK,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (“The primary purpose of ICSID is to provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes”).
101. See Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species
of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006).
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entirely behind closed doors, and the ICSID refused to accept any amicus briefs or
any other involvement by individuals or NGOs.102 The government further argued
that the practices of the ICSID were essentially unfair because it allows TNCs to
bring charges against the government, but it does not permit governments or
affected social groups to take any similar action against corporations.103 To make
matters worse, there is no effective process to challenge or appeal an ICSID
decision.104 Under these conditions, governments face potentially great financial
penalties for revising or revoking these privatization contracts, even if the revision
or revocation is based on human welfare and environmental concerns. If a right to
water is to be achieved, principles of global administrative law could greatly
enhance the ability of these tribunals to assist in that realization.105
While the scale of the Cochabamba protests was extraordinary, the experience is
not an isolated one. All around the world people have tried to fight back against
what they see as a widening socio-economic gap that is accelerated by neoliberal
agendas.106 The claim is that while the service might be improving for some, it is
usually at the expense of no access or poor quality to the poor because in order to
maximize profits and please their shareholders, corporations will prioritize access
and quality in the profitable areas rather than the marginal ones.107 The story of the
Bolivia Water Wars provides such an example. While the Bolivian protests were
effective at influencing the government to revoke the contract, similar social
protests do not always guarantee protection as the next case study will show, and
thus, it cannot be the only solution.
2. The Present Fight: Jakarta, Indonesia
The story of Jakarta is similar to that of the Cochabamba experience. It began
when the World Bank and International Monetary Fund required water
privatization in exchange for a $46 billion loan.108 Under great financial pressures,
the government accepted the loan’s conditions and, in 1998, divided its water

102. Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 143–48. This was not an unusual practice for the
ICSID, as, at the time, out of the 110 cases it had resolved, only two included public
hearings and only four allowed interested parties to present letters for consideration. Id.
103. Why Bolivia Quit the ICSID, ASEED.NET (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.aseed.net/
index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=491.
104. Id.
105. See infra Part IV.B.4.
106. See generally Patterns of Global Inequality: UNDP Report 1999, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 423 (producing evidence to show that the
number of people living in absolute poverty has increased over the last decades and that the
gap between the rich and the poor is now at historic levels); but see Dollar & Kraay, supra
note 21 (arguing that globalization has actually promoted economic equality and has reduced
poverty).
107. See Barlow, supra note 26.
108. HENI KURNIASIH, WATER NOT FOR ALL: THE CONSEQUENCES OF WATER
PRIVATIZATION IN JAKARTA, INDONESIA 1–2 (July 1–3, 2008), available at
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/mai/files/2012/07/henikurniasih.pdf (presented at the 17th
Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia).
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system into two service areas.109 The two private companies awarded the twentyfive year contracts were none other than Suez and Thames Water.110
The government approved these contracts, despite the provision in the
Indonesian Constitution declaring that “the land, the waters and the natural
resources within shall be under the powers of the State and shall be used to the
greatest benefit of the people.”111 Furthermore, Indonesia’s foreign investment laws
excluded water from the sectors in which foreign companies could invest.112 In an
attempt to provide legal justification for the transaction, however, the government
created new laws and applied them retroactively.113 In addition to these great legal
problems, the government directly appointed the private companies without
competition and without any input from the public.114
As a result of these political and legal issues, the government was eventually
replaced by a more legitimate power. However, the new government was still too
reluctant to revoke the contracts due to the potential legal action that would be
taken by these powerful corporations and the tremendous financial penalty it may
have to pay; instead, the new government attempted to renegotiate the contracts.115
However, there remain deep flaws in the new contract: there are low penalties
for the private sector’s failures; there are unclear investment targets; and, most
importantly, consumer protection has been neglected altogether.116 Important
aspects of the contract, such as the amount and priorities of investment, are still left
solely with the company.117
As a result of these flaws, the TNCs have been unable to achieve the target
goals, and the amount of actual investment has been even lower than before the
renegotiation.118 Residents currently criticize the quality and reliability of the
service as they must still boil their water to avoid contamination and must often
guess as to what times service will be available. Even now, the piped-water supply
is not available to all populations in Jakarta.119 Despite these failures, the water
tariff has increased significantly.

109. Id. at 4; IRFAN ZAMZAMI, JAKARTA WATER PRIVATIZATION TODAY: DRIED WATER
TAP, OR CHANGE (2012), available at http://www.waterjustice.org/uploads/attachments/
dried%20water_eng_for%20web.pdf.
110. As noted supra Part II.B., these are two of the Water Barons, and this case study
exemplifies how concentrated the private water sector has become: these contracts are
almost inevitably awarded to the same few corporations.
111. INDON. CONST. art. 33, § 3.
112. KURNIASIH, supra note 108, at 7.
113. See GOV’T REGULATION 22/1982 (Indon.); WATER RESOURCES LAW 11/1974
(Indon.). See generally Suharto Sarwan, Tjoek Walujo Subijanto, & Charles Rodgers,
Development of Water Rights in Indonesia, in WATER RIGHTS REFORM: LESSONS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 237, 240–41 (Bryan Randolph Bruns, Claudia Ringler, & Ruth
Meinzen-Dick eds., 2005).
114. KURNIASIH, supra note 108, at 7.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2–3, 9 (stating that in 2007, only sixty-one percent of Jakarta residents had
access to this system while the rest rely on the informal water supply, which is made of
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B. Environmental Effects
The effect of transnational corporate control of water has had an environmental
impact on communities as well. While the corporations focus on profit
maximization, as they are designed to do, they neglect to concern themselves with
environmental management and conservation efforts.120 As a result, they often
exploit the land for short-term profit without considering the long-term
consequences that such actions have on the land and its resources.121
A region could be suffering from unhealthy, drought-like conditions, but these
corporations will proceed to bottle their water supply and ship it across seas to sell
in vending machines to people in no real need—people who usually only have to
walk a few feet to find their water for free from a drinking fountain.122 The
corporations can do this because they are not accountable to the interests of the
citizens or the maintenance of the surrounding environment. However, water
distribution through pipe systems, which is the predominant method because it is
cheap and fairly simple, can be extremely land and water intensive, and the very
methods of extracting water from the land without considering its limitations can
have grave consequences.
In Jakarta, for example, a decade of exploitation of groundwater sources has
resulted in a rapidly-declining groundwater supply and increasing subsidence,
which occurs when large amounts of groundwater are withdrawn from the land
within a short amount of time.123 The effects of the current water extraction are
becoming clear, as Central Jakarta alone experienced more than a three-foot drop
over a twelve-year period.124 Such overexploitation and subsidence has the
potential to cause many environmental consequences, such as increased risks of
flooding, as evidenced by the 2007 flood that sent over 450,000 Indonesians fleeing
their homes.125
When TNCs can just pick up and move their investments when disaster occurs,
there is little motivation to take these environmental consequences into account
when they are making their agendas.126 As discussed, the current voluntary codes of
conduct and guidelines are simply too weak to ensure that these corporations
consider the environmental effects and adopt practices that prevent such abuses.
water vendors, private wells, bottled water, and bore water). See also Dofa Fasila, Cilincing
Residents Blame Dirty Tap Water for Spate of Health Problems, JAKARTA GLOBE (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/cilincing-residents-blamedirty-tap-water-forspate-of-health-problems/433469.
120. See Barlow, supra note 26.
121. Id.
122. See generally VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND
PROFIT (2002) (arguing that in order to combat environmental crises such as drought and
desertification, corporations must be limited in how much water they are permitted to extract
for trade purposes).
123. See Deden Rukmana, Jakarta’s Vulnerability to Global Warming, INDON. URB.
STUD. (Apr. 14, 2007, 7:06 PM), http://indonesiaurbanstudies.blogspot.com/2007/04/globalwarming-and-jakarta.html.
124. Id.
125. Id. But of course it is the government, and not the private companies, that must pay
the costs of flood management and cleanup.
126. See Barlow, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Considering that the global population has reached over seven billion, it is now
more important than ever to be cognizant of the consequences these actions have on
the limited resources that remain on this planet. There can be no realization of a
human right to water if the environment is so diminished that it cannot provide an
adequate water supply to the people.
C. Social Consequences
Often overlooked when exploring the consequences of TNCs on developing
countries is the social impact these corporations have on a people and their
traditional practices. Oftentimes, TNCs will come into local villages that have longpracticed water distribution methods, which are sometimes very creative and
efficient. These corporations will then cap their village well or replace old methods
with prepaid water meters.127 Not only does this take away a very crucial function
of that community, but as already discussed, it also comes at a high cost to its
residents.128
The impact is especially felt by communities that view the commons as a good
for the whole community to share and do not perceive water as something to be
bought or sold. Olivera explains that the Cochabamba people believe that the social
character of water must be preserved and the accrued rights of the local water
committees that have worked together to establish and maintain autonomous water
distribution methods must be protected.129 It is offensive to these cultures’ people,
who view water as something sacred, to be told they must pay for their water. This
brings up all sorts of issues concerning the westernization of the developing
world.130
When corporations come into these villages and make water difficult to obtain,
the community is broken up in a sense—people stop gratuitously sharing water
with their neighbors because they know that if they did, they may not have enough
for themselves or for their families.131 The lack of reliability of these services to
these poor communities intensifies the problems. There are many stories of fights
in these communities over mere buckets of water. To a westerner, this might not
make much sense, but, to those who depend on this water for survival, the priorities
of life become much different.132
There is one story that encompasses so many of the social consequences from
these water privatization schemes that is truly hard to forget. In many of these
communities where prepaid meters are installed, parents and heads of households
often take their tokens to work with them to ensure they are not stolen during the
day, but this means that the children are left home without any water for the entire

127. See OLIVERA, supra note 88, at 9.
128. See supra Part III.
129. OLIVERA, supra note 88, at 11.
130. See generally, Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles
and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006) (explaining why we should be critical of any
westernized system that attempts to intervene into traditional affairs because of the fear of
forcing western values and principles onto these cultures).
131. BLUE GOLD, supra note 71.
132. Id.
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day.133 One day, a shack caught fire in one of the local villages, but there was no
water available to stop the fire. The neighbors refused to use their tokens to help
put the fire out because that would mean they would be left without water.134
Without any fire services available in the area, the shack burned to the ground; to
the community’s dismay, two little girls were in the shack and died.135
Communities that at one point would never have even hesitated to help out their
fellow neighbors now have to consider the economic consequences of their every
decision. As one local said, “these corporate projects are taking away our
humaneness.”136
IV. HOW TO RECONCILE WATER AS AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOOD
The current forms of privatization that are dominating the global water sector
are incompatible with the recognition of a human right to water. Corporations are
not created for social purposes to provide services to those in need—they are
designed solely with the goal of profit maximization. However, the private sector’s
failure to provide better water services does not just reflect the flawed principles of
corporate water privatization. It also reflects the failure to protect the people’s
interests through effective regulations and governance mechanisms. In this era of
globalization, the traditional governance structures are no longer best suited to
regulate transnational corporate behavior and complex global issues. Because of the
power and influence TNCs have obtained in the water sector, the state should not
be the only one burdened with the obligation to protect human rights.
A. The Need for Global Governance
Economic globalization is an irreversible phenomenon. Therefore, we must
adopt new laws and principles in order to make the right to water meaningful
within the current system. However, it is important to first recognize that while the
state does need to play a significant role in the effective monitoring and regulation
of these corporations, there is also a strong need for some form of global
governance in the water sector. These corporations are especially difficult to
monitor, as they lack direct accountability to the public and have no real ties to the
country with which they contract, and therefore have no reason to restrain their
destructive behaviors.137 This unchecked corporate power cuts off the traditional
channel of democratic accountability and leaves the public completely out of the
decision-making process of a one-time public good.
The Jakarta case study provides one example of the ineffectiveness of state
regulation of TNCs. Upon privatizing its water services, the government
established the Jakarta Water Regulatory Board to monitor the corporations.
However, it had very little real power to function effectively because, as a weak
government, it ended up on the wrong side of a one-sided contract that left out clear

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.B and III.
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mechanisms for independent audits and monitoring devices and was ultimately
unable to adequately fund the Board.138 After prices increased substantially, with
no apparent justifications, the TNCs denied the public any access to the company’s
financial reports and never even made an attempt to justify the increases.139
Consequently, the government and the public were left with no real viable options
to contest the price hikes.
However, even greater concerns arose because there was no public input or
participation into the selection of these companies to begin with, nor any open
competition, to ensure a fair bid.140 Instead, the government was the sole decision
maker, and there are convincing arguments that particular governmental officials
stood to gain greatly from the agreements.141 Therefore, even the states themselves
need to be monitored to ensure that they would work for the best interests of their
citizens.
While the Jakarta protests have not seen the same success the Bolivian people
were able to achieve, this is not for a lack of trying. Individuals, communities,
NGOs, and trade unions have organized international petitions and gathered in the
streets of Jakarta and at city hall to protest against a government they feel is putting
the interests of its citizens second to the interests of the corporations.142 Political
resistance to privatization is a “formidable obstacle to municipalities looking to
explore a sale of their water assets to a private company.”143 However, as the
Jakarta protests exemplify, change is not a guarantee.
B. How to Apply Global Administrative Law Principles
There are numerous ways in which global administrative law could be applied to
the global water sector to assure the right to water is achieved. First, the struggle
for participation, transparency, and legitimacy in the decision-making process is
one of the central strands of administrative law. Therefore, it is possible that such
administrative law at the global scale could help fill this democratic deficit.
However, in order to assure that these principles are achieved, there is a need for a
global regulatory monitor, which could be found in the ISO, World Bank, or
International Monetary Fund, after some reform of these institutions’ current
practices. Lastly, judicial review and the recognition of these principles could
provide the legal authority and bases for governments and TNCs to guide their
behaviors.

138. KURNIASIH, supra note 108, at 8–9.
139. See supra Part III.A.2.
140. See KURNIASIH, supra note 108, at 12.
141. Id. See also Nila Ardhianie, Questioning ADB’s Loan to PALYJA, NGO FORUM ON
ADB, http://www.forum-adb.org/inner.php?sec=13&ref=extras&id=107.
142. See, e.g., Jakarta Water Privatization, PUB. SERVS. INT’L (Sept. 10, 2011),
http://www.world-psi.org/en/jakarta-water-privatization; Protestors Call for Terminating
Jakarta Water Privatization: The International Petitions to the Jakarta Governor, WATER
JUSTICE (June 10, 2011), http://www.waterjustice.org/?mi=1&res_id=300.
143. FOOD & WATER WATCH, TRENDS IN WATER PRIVATIZATION: THE POST-RECESSION
ECONOMY AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC WATER IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2010) (citation
omitted).
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1. Good Governance Principles and Values
The first way to implement global administrative law into regulation of the
water sector is through the principles of transparency and participation in the
privatization bidding process and selection. In both the Cochabamba and Jakarta
case studies, the public had absolutely no input and was not even informed about
the water privatization contract.144 This allowed the corporations to gain contracts
under almost no scrutiny, which arguably led to many of the complications with
each contract’s implementation. The lack of public participation and transparency
also intensified the public’s frustration and growing resentment toward the Bolivian
government. If individuals and NGOs were more involved in the process and were
given the ability to participate in notice-and-comment periods as these contracts
were being negotiated, collusive practices or ill-equipped investment strategies
would be more likely to be uncovered and prevented, and citizens would be less
inclined to take their dissatisfaction to the streets, as this is typically saved as a last
resort for many.
These principles would also be helpful in realizing more efficient contracts and
services by requiring corporations to produce evidence of reasoned decision
making in accordance with administrative fairness and rationality. This could
require consultation or simply open procedures such as investment targets. As
shown in the Jakarta case study, citizens were never even told why prices were
increased, and all requests to the information were denied.145 This transparency
could easily be improved through a requirement, enforced by global administrative
bodies, that significant price increases be accompanied by financial statements
upon request. Requiring informed reasoning and capabilities to take on a large
project such as water privatization could have prevented many of the price hikes
experienced in Cochabamba and Jakarta, as these companies were unprepared to
make the investments required to fulfill their contracts.
2. The Use of Global Monitors
The argument is that corporations are restrained to act in an efficient manner
through market mechanisms,146 but this could only be true if the corporations really
are subject to the market consequences. As mentioned earlier, these contracts are
typically one-sided; the Jakarta contract, for example, included profit guarantees to
the corporations regardless of the market processes.147 Furthermore, privatization
does not automatically increase competition. In the water sector, this is especially
clear, as there are very few companies actually competing, and often colluding
together, for these contracts.148
Fair contracts and healthy competition would help ensure the best services and
prices for the people. One way to achieve this goal is through the use of a global

144. See supra Part III.A.
145. See supra Part III.A.2.
146. See, e.g., Jennifer Naegele, What Is Wrong With Full-Fledged Water Privatization?,
6 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 99, 100–02 (2004).
147. KURNIASIH, supra note 108, at 13.
148. See supra Part II.B.
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monitor. International organizations, such as the ISO, could be used to act as antitrust regulators, reviewing and investigating contracts before they are implemented
to make sure there is no collusion or coercive activities occurring.149 Such a
regulator could also encourage governments to be assertive by requiring beneficial
conditions for the people such as price ceilings based on income or compensation
for the confiscation of self-sufficient water distribution systems. No longer should
struggling governments be compelled to sign contracts that discourage public
subsidies to hold down price increases or that protect corporate profits by
dollarizing water payments, as seen in the Cochabamba privatization contract.150
The ISO could also be useful in strengthening and giving meaning to their
current codes of conduct for these corporations in order to ensure that they take into
account the effects they have on the people and the environment in which they
contract with. The past attempts to compel these corporations to follow the codes of
conduct and guidelines have failed because there is no real authority that monitors
these corporations and compels them to adopt them into their procedures.151 The
Jakarta case study shows the consequences of the lack of penalties for the failure of
the private sector.152
Other international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, could
also be utilized as global monitors in this system of global governance. However,
before we can even consider such an option, there must be a real discussion on
significant institutional reform to assure that the same problems with the state are
not simply transferred to the global level.
3. Institutional Reform
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as two of the most
powerful financial institutions in the global economy, have been at the center of the
major economic issues of the past few decades.153 As this Note has illustrated, these
powerful organizations can have great impact on the countries they lend to and
supervise, so it is important to examine their agendas and the impacts of their
actions before giving them more authority and power as global monitors.
As the U.N. was established “on the belief that there was a need for collective
action at the global level for political stability,” the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund were established “on the belief that there was a need for collective
action at the global level for economic stability.”154 Initially recognizing that the
markets were not perfect, these institutions now seem to endorse market
supremacy.155 Even in the face of failed privatization attempts and mass citizen
protests, they continue to assume that what has worked in one country shall work
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everywhere in the world, but that is clearly not the reality, as the case studies have
revealed.156
However, it has been argued that the real problem is one of governance: “who
gets to decide what they do” and how they do it.157 Dominated by the wealthiest
industrial countries, most of their lending and activities take place in the developing
world; even the countries’ own representatives do not have the people’s interest in
mind, as they are typically chosen behind closed doors and closely tied to the
global financial community.158
These institutions are clearly not representative of the countries they are meant
to serve. They are publicly funded by taxpayers’ money, yet, they remain
unaccountable to the public, and their procedures are set without any input from the
people.159 One way to resolve this problem is to leave elections of the country’s
financial representatives to the people. While the initial voter turnout would
probably be low, the electoral motive, and also special elections for removal, could
ensure that these representatives keep the interests of the public as the top priority,
thus, more adequately representing these developing countries in the global
economy.
It is important that these organizations do not pressure struggling governments
into privatizing a vital public resource as a condition for a chance to better their
position in this globalizing world. Rather, these institutions need to explore more
alternatives to corporate privatization, such as leasing services to nonprofit
organizations or creating some type of meaningful public-private partnership where
the state retains ultimate policy-setting authority, but still allows for a specialized
business to run the day-to-day operations for which they are best suited in the first
place. However, privatization is not necessary, or even appropriate, everywhere,
and these institutions need to recognize that in their lending practices.
4. Judicial Review and Recognition of Principles
Judicial assistance is crucial in the effort to make this right meaningful. If courts
are willing to set precedent to act as guidelines for how governments should treat
their water supply, then conservation and fair use will be more likely. Legislatures
and courts must also work together to ensure that certain flexibilities are allowed in
order to best reconcile corporate control of such a vital resource, such as removing
the power of corporations to sue governments if their activity is constrained due to
health or environmental concerns, such as was the case in Cochabamba. At the very
least, judicial action should be guided by the principles of transparency and review,
particularly in international arbitration settlements.160 TNCs could actually benefit
from a functioning global administrative law that generates a global governance
entity in order to support, rather than undermine, the legitimacy of these
tribunals.161
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Judicial recognition of this right in domestic courts is another way a “top down”
approach could be useful, and a recent High Court Ruling in Johannesburg provides
such an example.162 In 2006, the Kalahari Bushmen took the Botswana government
to court when the government prioritized its land and water access to mining
companies and tourism after diamonds were discovered and attempted to evict the
Bushmen by capping their only major water borehole.163 While the court decision
allowed the Bushmen to return to their land, it did not include the right to their
water sources, so the Bushmen appealed to gain back this access.164
One week before the U.N. voted to recognize the right to water, a High Court
ruling again denied the Bushmen their water rights.165 However, in January 2011,
Botswana’s Court of Appeals unanimously held that the Bushmen not only had the
right to use their old boreholes but also had the right to sink new boreholes.166
Noting the U.N.’s recognition of the rights, the Court called the Bushmen’s
treatment by the government “degrading.”167 The Court further stated that it is
“entitled to have regard to international consensus on the importance of access to
water.”168
Most countries have a rule that they have to interpret domestic law in light of
international obligations such as the U.N. declaration of the right to water, and
therefore, the recognition by the Botswana Court of Appeals should set an example
for the courts of the rest of the world to exercise this power and make this right
meaningful within the current system.
CONCLUSION
“When the United Nations recognized the human right to water and
sanitation, humanity took a collective step forward in its evolution. But
this alone is not enough.”169–Maude Barlow
No acknowledgment of this right by itself can distribute water to the billions of
people in need so long as the current system of economic globalization and
unregulated corporate control remains unchallenged. The case studies provided
illustrate just some of the dire consequences developing countries face within the
current system, and they will continue to experience these detrimental effects
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unless and until the current state of law is transformed. Because globalization is an
irreversible phenomenon, in order to truly implement this right, the current
economic system must be confronted, and new policies based on transparency,
participation, and sustainability must be encouraged.
This Note explains that, through the use of global governance mechanisms, the
right to water can be meaningful, even within corporate privatization regimes.
Global administrative law principles offer various ways to help realize this right
through the implementation of good governance values, institutional reform, and
judicial recognition. Through the collective efforts of representative financial
institutions, global monitors, NGOs, and citizens of the world, these global
administrative principles make it possible to achieve this momentous right—the
protection of the world’s remaining water resources.

